Introduction
Constructivism as a metanormative theory is a relatively recent development in philosophy, although its roots can be traced back to Kant. John Rawls brought constructivism onto the scene in the form of his political philosophy and some of these ideas were then developed by Thomas Scanlon in his normative theory. But it is probably not until Christine Korsgaard that we have an attempt to bring constructivism into the domain of metanormative theory. It has since become a hotly debated issue, with a lot of the discussion focusing on Korsgaard's work. Recently, more constructivists have emerged with interesting takes on how to make constructivism a plausible metanormative theory, such as Aaron James and Sharon Street. Now that constructivism is firmly on the metanormative scene we can begin to unpick the main features of the theory and enquire as to how tenable it is.
Constructivism, in either its normative or metanormative guise, is roughly the view that there are correct answers to normative questions because there is a correct way of answering them; a normative judgement can be established and justified because it is the outcome of a correctly followed procedure for answering the normative question at hand. For metanormative constructivism, normative judgements can be objectively true, not because they are correctly tracking independent normative facts, as a traditional realist would have it, but because it has been 'constructed'; normative judgements are never true prior to them being the outcome of the correctly followed procedure. It is a theory of normative judgements and how they can be said to be true, where the truth of a normative judgement is explained in terms of the norms of practical reason being correctly followed.
If all of this can be fleshed out in a plausible way, then constructivism is a very appealing metanormative theory; we get all of the benefits of realism without any of the metaphysical baggage. The constructivist will not have to invoke any mysterious non-natural properties or risk falling prey to the open question argument. The challenge for constructivism, however, is to adequately explain what the 'procedure' is and how it is meant to guarantee the truth of a normative judgement. That is the focus of this paper.
In Chapter 1 I distinguish between constructivism as a normative and metanormative theory and try to give it the most charitable interpretation possible. I discuss how best to construe the notion of 'procedure' and conclude that it is best understood as practical reason.
I argue that if it is practical reason that is meant to guarantee the truth of a normative judgement, then the constructivist has to tell us something about the normativity of practical reason, how it is that there are certain ways we ought to think in regards to practical problems. In Chapter 2 I briefly discuss a number of ways of answering this question and then focus on the constitutivist theory offered by Korsgaard and James. I explain how such a theory accounts for the norms of practical reason and how this view can be compatible with constructivism. I then outline David Enoch's 'schmagency' objection to constitutivism and how it undermines the account of the norms of the procedure of construction. In Chapter 3 I outline Street's version of constructivism and her account of the normativity of practical reason and suggest how it might deal with Enoch's objection. I argue that ultimately Street falls prey to the schmagency objection due to weaknesses in her account of practical reason.
Finally, I conclude by suggesting a number of directions the constructivist might take if they wish to hold on to their account of normative judgements.
1. Constructivism
1.1
To get a clear understanding of constructivism and its distinguishing features as a theory, it will be useful to make a distinction between constructivism as a normative and a metanormative theory. Following Enoch (2009: 323) I will refer to these divisions as local and global respectively. As a metanormative view, constructivism is aiming to give an account of normative thought and discourse, showing how it is possible for a normative claim to be true without it being the case that it is referring to an independent normative fact. Local constructivism is a first-order view, establishing the conclusion of a normative claim through a constructive method. Local constructivism is concerned with moral claims that are argued for with a constructive procedure; global constructivism is concerned with practical normative statements that can be taken as true and objectively so because they are the correct outcome of a specified procedure. Local constructivism aims to give a constructive account of a subset of normative thought; global constructivism aims to show how all practical normative claims can be true. There are similarities in the methods between the two kinds of constructivism but also crucial differences in regards to their scope. It will be useful to begin with a discussion of what is possibly the most famous local constructivist view: the political philosophy of John Rawls. In seeing how Rawls constructs his two principles of justice, we will have in mind the kind of the thing a constructivist is doing and then extrapolate that feature of the theory to see how it is meant to work in regards to all practical normative claims.
Rawls employs a constructive procedure to establish a certain set of principles of justice for the organisation of the structure of a liberal democracy. For Rawls, they are not true because they are referring to independent normative facts -facts of the normative realm of justice -but because they are the outcome of a specific kind of procedure, the procedure that is right for establishing the principles of justice. Rawls holds that any agent, in a certain specified situation called the 'Original Position', would choose the same two principles of justice and thus 'construct' them. The agents that do the constructing are free and rational, and are ignorant of any particular contingencies of themselves. They are placed behind a 'veil of ignorance' where they know nothing of their gender, class, talents, nationality, place in history, concept of the good, or anything else that could induce bias and influence their selection of the principles of justice. The agents are fully rational in that they have full capability of practical reasoning. They have an adequate knowledge of human psychology and political institutions so as to be informed enough in their choice of the principles of justice that will structure societies' institutions. The agents are also taken to hold particular normative judgements implicit in a liberal democracy, namely concerning the freedom and equality of all people. In such a position, all agents would choose Rawls' two principles of justice, and these two principles would be the correct ones because they were 'constructed' from the Original Position (Rawls 1971, Ch. 3).
These principles were not the correct ones prior to the agent going through the procedure of choosing them in the Original Position. They are true because they were constructed from the right procedure; one that embodies certain normative claims about the irrelevance of certain contingencies and the freedom and equality of all humans. These normative ingredients in the procedure are not constructed from the Original Position itself; they are taken to be a part of the procedure and set the standards for which constructed principles are meant to apply; if the principles are in accordance with these standards then they are to be constructed; if not, then they are false. A subset of the normative domainnormative claims about justice -are constructed from a procedure that embodies other practical normative claims. Global constructivism aims not to construct a subset of practical normative claims; rather it aims to show how all practical normative claims can be true because they are constructed from a procedure. Global constructivism takes this basic ideaof constructing normative judgements from a procedure that has standards to follow -to give an account of all practical normative claims.
Statements of the form 'A ought to Φ' are far more broad in scope than 'The right principles to govern society are A and B'. The former encompasses all practical normative judgements, whether moral or instrumental, whereas the latter is itself a specific kind of normative judgement. Global constructivism aims to show why these former normative judgements can be objectively true, not use a certain argumentative method to demonstrate a particular conclusion about a normative area. What is supposedly distinctive of the theory is that it is arguing that normative judgements can be true because they can be the outcome of a correctly followed procedure; whereas for Rawls, his two principles are supposedly true because they followed a procedure. Constructivism is not aiming to conclude in a true normative judgement like Rawls; rather it is a theory of why normative judgments can be true at all. Local constructivism aims only to show why a specific normative judgement is the case.
For the local constructivist, the procedure specified is something entirely hypothetical; we are asked to imagine some hypothetical agent, in some specified situation, and imagine the reasoning that will proceed to a conclusion. For the global constructivist, the procedure is something more familiar: practical reasoning. We all engage in practical reasoning on a daily basis; it is not something hypothetical, but immediate. The procedure is one that humans engage in when faced with practical problems; we engage from the 'firstperson standpoint' and make a decision as to what to do. It is this standpoint and this decision making procedure that the constructivist wants to focus on. Although of course, different global constructivists construe the procedure of practical reason in different ways.
There is disagreement amongst constructivists and their commentators as to whether the procedure of construction is meant to be considered real and of our world or idealised in some sense. All are in agreement that it is indeed human practical reasoning that is the procedure of construction; it is this feature of our minds that actually engages in normative problems and results in normative judgements. The dispute seems to be over how exactly to construe practical reason; whether the procedure is the practical reason of this world, engaged in by real agents, or whether it is some idealised form of practical reason that an agent with flawless reasoning would engage in. Street's constructivism, for example, involves the actual normative judgements of real agents in the construction of the truth of other normative judgements 2010; Forthcoming) . Whereas for James, practical reasoning, if done correctly in optimal conditions, will always result in the right normative judgement and so rules out brute error of normative judgement. It is thus an idealised form of practical reason (2007; Forthcoming). For James then, the constructed judgements are the ones that would be constructed by an agent that correctly followed the norms of practical reason in optimal conditions. For Street, there are no optimal conditions or the imagining of an agent perfectly reasoning practically; the procedure is one followed by real agents involving real judgements.
James' view, whilst idealised, is not hypothetical in the way Rawls' procedure is; James' view still involves something we are very familiar with -practical reasoning -whereas Rawls' Original Position is something entirely fictional, devised specifically for the construction of principles of justice. Whilst James' procedure is idealised for the construction of all normative judgements, it is not fictional; it essentially involves practical reason, and that is not too unfamiliar, even if his version is idealised. In this sense then, he is more in line with Street with her insistence on focusing on the real judgements of agents in the construction of practical normative judgements. Both Street and James, whilst differing on how to construe the procedure, still agree on what that procedure essentially is: practical reason engaged in by human agents.
1.2
The procedure of construction can guarantee the truth of a normative judgement, not by tracking normative facts, but rather by 'constructing' the truth once the procedure has been correctly followed. As we saw in 1.1, the global constructivist construes the procedure of construction as practical reason; thus, to follow the procedure correctly for construction, one must follow the norms of practical reason. I shall draw on the work of Korsgaard, James, and Street, and weave together the defining aspects of their views that they have in common in order to present the clearest and most plausible interpretation of the kind of procedure that a constructivist has in mind.
The procedure is what is meant to guarantee the truth of the judgement because it is the right kind of procedure for engaging in practical problems and has standards that can be correctly followed. This differentiates it from realism, which would say that the procedure is right because it tracks the normative truths in the right way. Following Korsgaard then, we can say that the constructivist makes a distinction between procedural realism and substantive realism. As Korsgaard puts it:
Procedural moral realism is the view that there are answers to moral questions: that is, there are right and wrong ways to answer them. Substantive moral realism is the view that there are answers to moral questions because there are moral facts or truths, which those questions ask about (1996: 35) .
For the constructivist then, the procedure is not being employed to track some pre-existing independent normative fact; it is what we have to do to be able to decide how to answer our normative questions. However, this does not stop there being right answers to normative questions because there is a correct way of answering them. There does not have to be a preexisting fact for us to decide what to do; all that is needed is for there be a 'correct or best procedure' for answering our normative questions and then 'there is some way of applying the concepts of the right and the good' (Ibid). Our normative questions are presented to us as practical problems; it is us that have to engage with them, think through what to do and what would be right. It is thus us that engages in practical reason and make the resulting judgement. Because of this then, the constructivist thinks it is important to note that we engage with moral and normative questions from the first-personal standpoint.
When one thinks about a normative problem and engages with the reasons for and against an action it is done from the first-personal standpoint; that is, it is done by an agent, someone doing the thinking and deliberating. It is not done externally; that is, it is not done from a standpoint outside of deliberation. It is in the first-person standpoint that the decision of what to do is made. It is decided within this practical standpoint by someone of what they
should do and what course of action to take; the procedure is undertaken from the first-person standpoint resulting in decisions of what to do, and these decisions, if the procedure is correctly followed, are right answers to practical problems. There is a difference in emphasis on this standpoint depending on the constructivist: Street, for example, places great emphasis on what she thinks are defining features of this standpoint (which will be discussed in Chapter 3). What is important to note for now is that the constructivist thinks the constructed judgements are made after engaging in practical reason, and this is done by agents firstpersonally.
How practical reason is characterised differs entirely on the constructivist philosopher in question, but all seem to be united on one thing. When the agent engages in practical reason from the first person standpoint and deliberates, the agent may follow the rules of this procedure correctly or incorrectly; that is to say, they may succeed in following the norms of practical reason or not. If the norms are accorded with and practical reason has been successful, the resulting judgement is true. It is true precisely because the correct procedure has been followed in the correct way; practical reason does not track independent truth, it only engages in practical problems and so long as its norms are followed, the resulting judgement is correct.
Once the true judgement of what to do is constructed, there is then a normative reason for action. If the constructed judgement is true then it is the correct prescription of what the agent in question ought to do. The judgement will be something like 'A ought to Φ,' and as long as the procedure has been correctly followed, this will be the right judgement and therefore it is the case that A ought to perform Φ. Normative judgements purport to be authoritative, providing an overriding reason to perform a certain course of action. If the constructed judgement is correct, then an overriding reason to perform Φ has been constructed for A to follow. Constructivism therefore constructs norms; once the truth of a judgement is constructed, it is a fact that the relevant course of action really ought to be followed by the relevant agent; they have a normative reason to follow the action; a standard has been constructed that they ought to adhere to.
We can see now then that constructivism can be distinguished by two things: one concerning the truth conditions of normative judgements and the other a metaphysical feature concerning the relation between the truth of the judgement and the thinking the agent does in making that judgement.
1 The judgements that result from the procedure are substantive; they hold that some actual course of action is right and ought to be followed. A realist would hold that the judgement can only be true because it is a judgement about an independent normative fact. But for the constructivist, what makes the judgement true is that it is the outcome of the correct procedure; the judgement's truth condition is not some independent state of affairs that will obtain if the judgement is true; rather the condition is the correct following of the norms of practical reason. The relation of truth for the constructivist is from the procedure to the judgement, rather than from a judgement to a fact. There are no independent conditions to be met to guarantee the truth of a judgement; the only condition is the following of the constructive procedure. The truth of the judgement is 'constructed' by the following of the procedure, and this 'construction' is a metaphor for the metaphysical relation of the truth of the judgement and how the truth is arrived at. The metaphysical priority for the truth of the judgement is the procedure; there is no truth prior to the outcome of the procedure. And there is no procedure except that done by an agent engaging from the first-personal standpoint and
making judgements about what they ought to do in regards to practical problems. It is these two features that attempt to make constructivism a distinctive metanormative theory: its account of the truth conditions for normative judgements, and the metaphysical priority of the procedure to the truth of a judgement.
1.3
Constructivism as a metanormative theory aims to explain how a normative judgement may be objectively true without invoking any of the metaphysics of the realist. Normative judgements can be taken as true if and only if they are the outcome of the correct procedurepractical reason -and the standards of that procedure have been adhered to. In other words, the agent must follow the norms of practical reason for them to make a true normative judgement. The norms of the procedure give guidance as to how to think about the practical problems. Only when the norms of the procedure are followed will the resulting judgement have authoritative status. So how does the constructivist account for the norms of practical reason? What are they exactly? How are they to be construed? How is the constructivist to explain where they get their authority from? Must they give a constructivist account for these norms as well? The constructivist has to tell us a convincing story about the normativity of practical reason.
Korsgaard, James and Constitutivism

2.1
In the last chapter we saw that the constructivist holds that moral judgements can be true if the procedure has been correctly followed and that there is a metaphysical priority of this procedure to the truth of the judgement. The agent cannot make any old judgement however;
it is only those that are the result of correctly following the procedure; it is by constructing judgements through practical reasoning that makes them true. However practical reason is construed by the constructivist, for the procedure to be correctly followed so the output can be true, it must be the case that there are norms of practical reason. It must be the case that there are ways of going right and wrong when following the procedure; that is, the procedure itself must be normative in some way. How is the constructivist to account for the normativity of practical reason? The constructivist's answer here must be one that is consistent with their view.
What are we to think of the norms of practical reason? Presumably, they are certain ways of thinking about practical problems; more importantly, they are meant to be the right way to think about them. As Aaron James puts it 'Practical reasoning is a process of consideration which issues in judgement ' (2007: 315) . These 'considerations' cannot be arbitrary; they must be guided by norms for our practical thinking to issue in a true judgement. Candidates for such norms could be the ones emphasised by Kantians, that of the hypothetical and categorical imperatives. The hypothetical imperative tells us that we ought to take the most relevant means to the end that we will. If I will the end of 'catching the train at 12:00' and the most efficient means to achieving this end is by leaving my house at 11:00, then I ought to take this means according to the hypothetical imperative. It is a normative principle of practical thought; a way we ought to think about practical problems we face in achieving our goals. What of the categorical imperative? In the Groundwork Kant states the categorical imperative as so: 'Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law ' (1993: 30) . The categorical imperative states then that we ought to only act on principles that are universalisable; that is, principles we can expect everyone else to follow. This clearly rules out a principle, say, of allowing theft; for if theft was universalised there would be no property for anyone to steal. Thus it is a contradiction for Kant; for it to be legislated there has to be property, but if it was legislated there would be no property. following these general norms, the agent encountering the practical problem will make a judgement, and it is only by following these norms that make it the correct judgement.
Clearly this is different to the Korsgaardian notion of thinking only in accordance with
Kantian imperatives; the norms are far more varied concerning taking facts into account. But they are similar to Korsgaard in a sense which will become important in the next section, that they are constitutive of practical reason.
2.2
What makes Korsgaard's and James' norms of practical reason normative in the first place;
that they have the status that they ought to be followed? What account do they give as to why these are the ways for guiding our practical thought that have authority? We saw in 
2.3
How then is the constructivist to account for the norms of the procedure, the normativity of practical reason? The rest of this paper will explore two options. The first, what will occupy the rest of this chapter, is a formal account in the Kantian tradition; where substantive judgements are meant to be constructed out of merely formal specifications of practical reason. The normativity of these formal specifications is given a constitutivist account by Korsgaard and James. This faces a powerful objection by David Enoch which will require an adequate response by the constructivist if they wish to salvage their theory.
As we saw in 2.1, Korsgaard and James both endorse formal views of the norms of practical reason: for Korsgaard, the hypothetical and categorical imperatives; for James, a series of general formal norms for directing our attention to features of the situation that embodies our practical problem. Both sets of norms are formal in the sense that they do not make any specific recommendations or imperatives; they do not involve any instances when explicating what they are. They are general guides for directing our thought in practical reason; when practically reasoning about a problem, then there will be substantive judgements involved, but the norms themselves as part of their nature do not make or involve specific guides or imperatives about particular instances. follow. These norms can be followed correctly or not and therefore the procedure of construction can be successful if the norms of practical reason were correctly followed.
Both Korsgaard and James take a route like this. 
2.4
We can see then that the constructivist who takes a formal approach to the norms of practical reason is in some sense parasitic upon the constitutivism they employ to account for the normativity of the procedure of construction. We can ask to what extent is the approach taken by Korsgaard and James in the spirit of constructivism, whether it can be consistent with constructivism that it is so parasitic on a different metanormative view. When pushed to 5 So does Velleman (2000) . I have left out a discussion of his work for reasons of space and because he does not supplement his constitutivism with a constructivism about normative judgements.
answer why norms can be constructed, the constructivist has fallen back on a different account for the norms of the procedure.
This should not be too much trouble for constructivists like Korsgaard and James;
they can simply take it on the chin and accept that their constructivism has not gone 'all the way down' in the sense of 'constructing' the norms of the procedure. As suggested in 2.2, James effectively says that the constructivist is only committed to a theory of normative judgements and how they are capable of being true. As my account of constructivism in
Chapter 1 showed, the constructivist thesis is one of the truth conditions of normative judgements and the metaphysical relation therein. This is explained in terms of a procedure involving other norms; and thus, the norms constructed are explained in terms of other norms.
The formal constructivist can simply say that the norms of practical reason have a kind of priority such that they cannot be given a constructivist account. The norms of practical reason are better seen as norms for constructing other norms; they are the norms that are constitutive of our agency and practical reason and are the materials for the construction of normative judgements. Their status as normative is prior to that of the normativity of any judgement, and this is best understood as their being constitutive. Because of their priority as being constitutive of practical reason itself, they cannot be given a constructivist account.
Constructivism then can rely on these norms with priority without threatening its account of the truth of normative judgements.
2.5
Formal constructivists like Korsgaard and James seem to be in a good position; they have accounted for the normativity of the procedure of construction by giving a constitutivist account of its norms that is compatible with a constructivist account of normative Street has something very similar in mind with her version of constructivism. The practical point of view is one that is held by agents when they endorse a normative judgement. We obviously hold a whole host of normative judgements, some about moral duties, some about ourselves and our relations to our loved ones and life projects. It is these judgements that supply the standard, constitutive of holding these judgements themselves, for judging a further normative judgement as true or not. For example it is constitutive of my judging that 'I ought to attend my friend's birthday' that I not judge 'I ought to go to the cinema at the same time'. If I held the latter judgement then I could not properly count as endorsing the former judgement. So the judgement 'I ought not to go to the cinema at the same time as my friend's birthday' is constitutive of my holding the original judgement. This is a true normative judgement for me because of the normative judgements I hold. The commitments of my normative judgements entail that I endorse the latter judgement; it is these commitments that we judge the truth of a judgement against; if the judgement is inconsistent with the commitments, it is false. The constitutive commitments of our judgements supply the normative standard for construction in the procedure.
The target judgement has to withstand scrutiny from all our other normative judgements, so we can imagine the procedure being like this. Take some potential normative judgement J that can be endorsed by an agent A. Then imagine the set of A's normative judgements J*, which is all of their endorsed normative judgements except for J. J is a true normative judgement if it withstands scrutiny from J*; that is, whether it accords with all the commitments that are constitutive of holding J*. If it does withstand this procedure then J is a true practical judgement for A and can be considered as part of her set of normative judgements. This can be done for every one of A's judgements, so we just subtract a judgement J from her set of normative judgements and see if it survives, and carry on doing this for all of her judgements. This procedure applies to all of A's normative judgements; they are true practical judgements for her if all her judgements can survive this procedure of scrutiny from the standpoint of all of her other judgements. If an agent does this then they will have a mutually-supporting web of normative judgements, where each one is justified by all the others.
Note that judgements about reasons are only ever judgements about the reasons for the agent in question in accordance with their already held judgements; there is a kind of relativism in play, something acknowledged by Street (2008: 226) . As the correctness standard for a judgement is set by the endorsed judgements of an agent, the correctness of the resulting judgement can only be correct for that agent; the constructed truth of the judgement is relative to that agent's set of judgements. These are constitutive norms, but they are constitutive of our already held substantive normative judgements, not practical reason. When one is faced with a practical problem, one is to engage in practical reason, and the standards one is to live up to so as to arrive at the right conclusion are those that are constitutive of the judgements one already holds. One follows the norms that one ought to follow if one can be said to hold these judgements, and by following these norms, one will arrive at a judgement that is coherent with one's other judgements. Practical reason has normative rules to follow because they are constitutive of holding a normative judgement, and the only way to engage in practical reason is from the standpoint of already held normative judgements: there is no other way to do it according to
Street. The only standards of correctness are those set by our normative judgements, so the normativity of practical reason comes from the constitutive commitments of our normative judgements; one ought to think in accordance with one's judgements because they are constitutive of them. You are making the constitutive judgement even if you are not aware of it and by not noticing this you are thereby making a mistake; you are failing to live up to the standards that are set by your own judgements. 'For one normative judgement to withstand scrutiny from the standpoint of other judgements, then, is for that judgement not to be mistaken as determined by the standards of correctness that are constitutively set by those other normative judgements in combination with the non-normative facts' (Street 2008: 231) .
The normativity of practical reason is accounted for by the constitutive commitments of our already held judgements; we ought to think a certain way in practical reasoning because we are already committed to doing so by our own judgements.
We can see how this differs from the formal accounts given by Korsgaard and James.
Korsgaard and James in their constitutivism think that there are norms of practical reason because such norms are a part of what practical reason is; to engage in practical reason just is to follow these norms. These norms are there for us to follow, as something constitutive of the kind of reasoning practical reason is. These are norms that we can follow correctly or not and our resulting judgements of practical reason are true if they follow such norms and false if they do not. For Street, norms are constitutive and are to be followed in practical reasoning, but they are not constitutive of practical reason itself. Rather, they are constitutive of holding a normative judgement. It is when these judgements are used in practical reasoning that their constitutive commitments achieve the status of being norms or standards for us to live up to. So because there are norms that constitute holding normative judgements, we must take into account our actually held substantive normative judgements when we are engaging in practical reasoning. These are the only norms for us to follow in practical reason; those that are constitutive for us because they are constitutive of the judgements we happen to hold. Korsgaard and James make no mention of this; there are norms for us to follow, we can do so correctly or not, and this is regardless of any of our normative judgements. Street then, makes a substantive move from the formal accounts of Korsgaard and James in focusing on the role of substantive judgements in the normativity of practical reason. Whilst she makes no point of mentioning any particular judgements we must have in practical reason, she does make the point of saying that some substantive judgements are required for us to be reasoning practically at all, for it is the rules of holding these judgements that will provide the standards for construction. The normativity of practical reason then, comes from the norms that constitute using a normative judgement in such reasoning.
3.3
How can Street use this account to respond to Enoch's schmagency objection? We first need to look at comments she makes in a recent paper in regards to Korsgaard's 'regress argument. ' Korsgaard's argument (1996, Ch. 3) aims to derive moral reasons from the standpoint of practical reason as such, in accordance with the kind of formal account outlined in Chapter 2. Her point is that any agent has moral reasons just by the fact she is an agent.
Korsgaard is trying to find the 'source' of normativity; what is it that could actually make our judgements authoritative, and believes she has found it in our identity as human beings. My identity as a friend gives me certain normative reasons to behave in a certain way, but I can call this identity into question, asking for further reasons to endorse it. This regress, it seems, can go on indefinitely, where we never find a normative reason to underpin all our identities and the reasons they supply. According to Korsgaard, this line of questioning can only go so far because we eventually reach our identity as humans, as creatures who require certain identities to be able to act. The regress cannot continue because we cannot ask for a reason to have the identity of 'human'; we already have such an identity and it supplies us with normative reasons, both for action and for having further identities. So just by being human, a creature that engages in practical reason and requires identities, we are necessarily committed to our identity as humans and the reasons it supplies, and the regress ends.
Street thinks this line of argument fails for reasons I will not go into 7 and then goes on to argue for how she thinks the regress can end. I outlined in 3.1 how Street views the procedure of construction, where judgements are entailed and justified by other judgements which are in turn justified in the same manner. The result is a mutually-supporting web of normative judgements, all true for the agent in question, or as Street puts it 'a coherent web of interlocking values, such that each one, when taken in its turn and examined from the standpoint of the others, stands up to scrutiny in terms of the standards those other values set'
(Forthcoming). When scrutinised far enough we will reach the agent's most held and justified normative judgements, ones that they could not do without so to speak. When we pose the normative question, the one that the fear of regress arises from, we will ask 'Why endorse this set of normative judgements? Why this web as opposed to some other?' Street thinks that questions of this sort posed to the web of constructed, mutually-supported judgements are actually ill-formulated and cannot be given a legitimate answer. As we have seen, Street thinks it is only an agent's normative judgements that can supply the standard for assessing a normative judgement and as the question is formed, there cannot be any answer because there are no standards to assess it by. Stepping back and asking why one ought to endorse this set of judgments means suspending all of one's judgements and thus all of the standards used to assess judgements; and without any standards we cannot even expect an answer. The question is being posed 'from nowhere' where there are no standards and according to Street we cannot engage in practical reason in this way. 'One cannot sensibly step back from the entire set of one's interlocking normative judgements at once, and ask, from nowhere, whether this set is correct or incorrect, for on a constructivist view there are no independent standards to fix an answer to this question' (Ibid). The question is illegitimate because there is no way for the set of judgements to withstand scrutiny from the standpoint of other normative judgements.
I think we can see here the clues to how Street thinks there are resources in her account of practical reason to counter Enoch's schmagency objection, which she mentions in a footnote in a forthcoming paper (fn. 25). Enoch's objection was aimed at the kind of constitutivism outlined in Chapter 2, charging that the normativity of practical reason has not been accounted for because we can always question why an agent ought to engage in practical reason, why they ought to be an agent at all. Even if the norms of practical reason are constitutive of it, such an account does not provide a constitutive norm to engage in practical reason. So how would Street respond to this? It would help to recast the question in terms Street would accept. If Enoch is asking why be an agent we need to ask what it is to be an agent for Street. As discussed, to be an agent is to adopt the practical point of view, where this means to endorse a normative judgement of some sort. So, reformulated, Enoch's question becomes 'Why adopt any normative judgement at all?' For Street then, this sceptical question will be one asked 'from nowhere'; it is a question being posed from outside the practical point of view completely, thus suspending all normative judgements and their constitutive standards to judge any answer by, and thus is an illegitimate question.
Practical reasoning requires substantive normative judgements for us to reason about normative matters and Enoch's reformulated question does away with all of an agent's substantive judgements. There is no way of assessing whether one ought to adopt normative judgements instead of no normative judgements whatsoever; the only way of practically reasoning about such matters would be for us to have normative input in our reasoning and be done from the standpoint of some other normative judgements, but the nature of the question bars all normative input. Therefore, we do not have to answer Enoch's 'schmagency' objection because it is ill-formulated; there are no standards for us to judge any answer by.
Her account of practical reasoning and its substantive move gives Street the resources to respond because she can insist that practical reasoning can only be done with an agent in possession of normative judgements, and the schmagency objection suspends all judgements.
3.4
Street would be too quick to brush off Enoch's objection as unanswerable; her response falls prey to an objection that runs parallel to her response to the regress argument. The objection argues that such questions are formulated perfectly fine, that there is definitely a way in which they can make sense, even if, as Street believes, there are no standards for them to be answered by. To bring out this objection it will help by using a pair of examples, beginning with the one that applied to her response to the regress problem. normative judgements such as 'I need to urinate so I ought to go to the bathroom'. The first thing to say is that the example is not too extreme; sadly this experience of a loss of all value in the world is a real one experienced by too many people: they really do question whether anything at all in the world is worth caring about. As for the notion of making minimal judgements, Albert may think that he ought to go to the bathroom and is then motivated by the judgement, but that does not take away from the fact that in his malaise he really does question whether it is worth caring about, along with everything. Plus, it may be the case that in such a depressive daze he could be barely said to be making normative judgement about going to the bathroom, actually acting upon something closer to instinct.
Following from this point, Street may say because of his deep malaise and existential crisis there is some kind of error in Albert's thinking; he is not thinking clearly because of the malaise and is therefore doing the illegitimate thing of questioning all normative judgements.
Albert maybe slightly offended by this claim; he might say that he is in fact thinking very clearly on these matters and that is why he is in such a malaise. He is thinking about these matters constantly, exhausting himself mentally on them. Those in the grip of a kind nihilism are almost thinking too much about these matters, in the sense that they are exhausting The constructivist could say that Street's substantive move is not necessary to try and counter Enoch's objection and that a purely formal account is fine the way it is. All that has to be done, the constructivist could say, is to directly undermine Enoch's objection, and then we will have our constitutivism intact and thus an account of the normativity of the procedure of construction. Perhaps they could argue that there is something so fundamentally different between the activity of agency and any other activity that it does not make sense to pose Enoch's question. Similarly, they could argue that agency is such a thing that need not and cannot have a norm for engagement in it. This is roughly what Luca Ferrero (2009) has argued, and whilst it has been challenged by Enoch (2011) , it could still possibly be a fruitful avenue.
Another possibility not explored in this paper and one woefully neglected in the literature can be found in the work of Mark LeBar (2008) and his 'Aristotelian constructivism'. LeBar goes further than Street's substantive move in that he thinks that the norms of practical reason involve an entirely substantive norm for directing our practical thought: eudaimonia. Not only is this substantive norm one we must be directed by in our practical thinking if we are to count as reasoning practically, LeBar holds that it is a norm that is in fact constructed, thus reopening the possibility of constructivism going 'all the way down'. Whilst similar challenges to the ones in this paper will re-emerge, concerning whether an agent can count as reasoning practically if they are not reasoning in accordance with eudaimonia, the fact that it is a constructed, substantive norm means that new avenues of possibility may be opened up for constructivism.
The last possibility I wish to mention is one unexplored as far as I know. The constructivist could attempt a unified theory of normative judgments -both epistemic and practical -so that reasons for both belief and action are constructed once constitutive norms have been followed. The constructivist could argue, in the vein of someone like Wedgwood (2002) , that belief has an aim and that therefore gives theoretical reasoning constitutive norms. The constructivist could then suggest that this is structurally similar to practical reason and therefore invites a unified account of normativity, perhaps one regarding constitutive norms of thought in general. Again, some kind of schmagency equivalent will arise for theoretical reasoning -we can imagine an interlocutor asking why she ought to care about being a theoretical enquirer -but if the possibility of a unified account of normativity is fully explored by a constructivist, resources may become available for them to respond to it head on. Plus, if the constructivist is to focus on the importance of epistemic norms in understanding the norms of practical reason, this may supply further resources.
This has all been rather vague and speculative, but I hope it suggests that it is not quite game over for the constructivist. No matter what route the constructivist takes however, if they are to account for the truth of normative judgements in terms of the norms of practical reasoning being correctly followed, the schmagent is going to haunt the constructivist like a spectre.
